Governance features for successful REDD+ projects organization

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A B S T R A C T
Projects aiming at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) still account for a small share of the voluntary carbon market. Indeed, although carbon buyers claimed REDD credits to be the most desirable ones, and despite the steps forward for a REDD+ approval under the UNFCCC, REDD+ project development appears problematic. Good governance is often a prerequisite for the development of a REDD+ project. With the scope of determining the governance features for a successful REDD+ project, the research proposes a logical framework for REDD+ project governance assessment. Starting from the Governance of Forests Initiative Toolkit developed by the World Resource Institute, a set of REDD+ governance indicators are selected and applied in two Peruvian REDD+ field case studies. The methodology is then tested on REDD+ projects where no primary information is available. REDD+ projects are found to be successful when transparency and accountability are carefully addressed and when forest management and land use planning are endorsed. In this sense the Forest Stewardship Council certification appears to be an important pre-condition for the success of REDD+.
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1. Introduction

Forest degradation and deforestation mainly occur in the tropics and account for at least 15% of the global anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (Van der Werf et al., 2009). During the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, projects aiming at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and supporting the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+) were confirmed as priority measures to reduce forestry-based carbon emissions through a regulated market (UNFCCC, 2009). The early Avoided Deforestation (AD) proposal called for a national level implementation to prevent leakage risks inherently associated with project-based forest conservation activities (Santilli et al., 2003). Despite this, the need for a rapid on-the-ground testing of the AD proposal has allowed the development of pilot project-based activities under the broader set of initiatives projected by the United Nations REDD Programme and the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. The possibility of developing sub-national activities, either at provincial or federal state level, has been called the “hybrid or nested” approach (Pedroni et al., 2008) and is likely to heavily involve local institutions. In the short term fast track actions are likely to be financed through bilateral and multilateral agreements, as confirmed during the REDD+ Partnership meeting at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference held in May 2010 and seeing a pledge of 4 billion USD.1

Parallel to the policy discussion on the regulated market, REDD+ projects are already reaching the end of the pipeline in the voluntary carbon market. Single project interventions are likely to play an important role in both the markets, regulated and voluntary. Despite the intense and sometimes passionate international political debate, so far the role of REDD+ projects in the voluntary Over-the-Counter (OTC)2 market has been marginal (Hamilton et al., 2007; Hamilton et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 2010) (Fig. 1). Apart from the traditional difficulties for project developers to demonstrate additionality, ensure permanence, no leakage effects and correct baseline estimation connected to the delay in the approval of REDD+ methodologies (Hamilton et al., 2009), there are critical organizational aspects related to governance, such as dealing with stakeholders’ participation (e.g. governments and forest dependent communities), tenure of land and carbon credits, transparency and accountability in the decision-making process, etc. (Lawlor et al., 2010).

In fact, a good governance system, based on a clear regulatory framework, effective law enforcement and transparent and participatory...
decision-making, is often claimed as an essential element for the successful implementation of REDD+ projects (Saunders and Reeve, 2010; Forsyth, 2009; Saunders et al., 2008). Funds provided to countries with poor governance systems are likely not to be used in an efficient and effective way unless they are invested, at least to some extent, in improving the governance system.

The debate on governance in the forestry sector, and recently in particular concerning REDD+, is dealing with national or international governance issues, their measurement and monitoring. Several initiatives are developing forestry and REDD+ governance indicators applicable either at international or national level. Saunders and Reeve (2010) reviewed at least 11 initiatives of this type. Special attention to governance systems is justified by the fact that the national circumstances also influence the decision-making capacity at local and project level (Kjær, 2004). This is the case for example of land tenure or, in the case of REDD+, the importance of avoiding international leakage (Saunders and Reeve, 2010).

However, as suggested above, in the short term a stepwise approach to REDD+ based on single project to national strategies is also likely to have realistic impacts and generate useful experiences. Thus, parallel to the national and international governance dimension it is necessary to understand what features of the governance are positively affecting the success of single REDD+ projects.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding on the influence of governance features on the success of single REDD+ projects. Independently of the adopted definition, governance entails a network of actors and rules at local, national and international level pursuing a common goal (Sandbrook et al., 2010). In the case of REDD+ the common goal is to reduce or halt forest degradation and deforestation, and the network can be identified as the REDD+ project actors, their decision-making process, participation instruments, interactions and adopted rules. This study will try to focus on the governance level within the single project network.

The specific objectives of the study include: (a) developing a logical framework for analyzing the governance features of REDD+ projects on the basis of the broad set of data collected in two REDD+ case studies; (b) tuning and improving the logical framework through the analysis of REDD+ projects for which only secondary data were available.

Consequently this study will try to answer the following question: what are the governance features that determine the success of a REDD+ project? How can these governance features be systematically analyzed and monitored?

2. Methodology and case studies

There is no recognized methodology to assess which governance features should be considered for the successful organization of a single REDD+ project (Motel et al., 2009). The exploratory logical framework for REDD+ project governance assessment developed in this study is based on four steps (Fig. 2):

1. definition of a logical framework based on the identification of governance indicators applicable to the analysis of single REDD+ projects;
2. case studies selection;
3. testing of the selected governance indicators in two REDD+ case studies through field analysis with primary and secondary data and identification of relevant governance indicators for the success of REDD+ projects;
4. testing of the relevant governance indicators in other REDD+ projects in the same country as the case studies and for which no primary information is available.

2.1. Development of a logical framework for analyzing the governance features for REDD+ projects

Applicable governance indicators are taken from those developed by the World Resource Institute under the Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) (Brito et al., 2009). In the 2009 publication “The Governance of Forests Toolkit (Version 1): a draft framework of indicators for assessing governance of the forest sector”, the GFI suggests 5 principles of good forest governance (transparency, participation, accountability, coordination and capacity) and details 94 indicators analyzing four core governance issues (forest tenure, land use planning, forest management, forest revenues) divided into three governance components (actors, rules and practice). The latter distinction is not considered in this study due to time constraints and the need to focus on principles of good governance and core forestry issues. Therefore, only those indicators applicable to the project level (local level) are taken into account; indicators exclusively referring to the national/international analysis are excluded.

2.2. Selection of case studies

Both the selected case studies, the Maderacre & Maderyja Madre de Dios Amazon REDD Project (on forward M&M) and the Belgica REDD Project (on forward Belgica) are located in south-east Peru, close to its borders with Brazil and Bolivia (Fig. 3). The project areas are adjacent, close to the newly opened Carretera Interoceánica Sur (South Interocéanic Highway) in the Amazon Basin area. Extensive primary and secondary information concerning the organization of the projects was collected during 2009. A summary description of the two projects is presented in Table 1, following the Forest Carbon
research methodology was stakeholders’ consultation,3 based on a logical chain of evidence. The Vayda method leads researchers to an increasingly broader sive increase of REDD+ issues understanding and knowledge acquisi-
actors involved and information gathered expand with the progres-
can be represented as an understanding spiral, where number of
the Kalimantan region of Indonesia in the early ‘90s. The method
Gathering method was adopted (Vayda, 1983). This human ecology
Importance of REDD+ issues at national level and possibility of
effectiveness of certain carbon standards is still under discussion
(Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007).

Fig. 3. Selected REDD+ project areas.

The two projects satisfy all the following criteria applied for the case studies selection:

- Same environmental, social, institutional and national governance context of the projects in order to enhance internal validity of the comparison (Josse et al., 2007);
- Diverse target definition in relation to the carbon credit offer: while Belgica is looking only at the OTC market, M&M is also targeting the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) market.
- Diverse network of actors: the two case studies have different concession owners and actors (a native community with a majority of private actors in Belgica vs. logging companies and Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs – in M&M);
- Importance of REDD+ issues at national level and possibility of study outcomes dissemination and application at national level: Peru with 68.7 million hectares of forests, 98% tropical humid, is the ninth country in the world for forest area and the second in South America after Brazil (FAO, 2006, 2010; Kramme, 2009).

For data collection the Progressive Contextualization Information Gathering method was adopted (Vayda, 1983). This human ecology research methodology was first applied for studying deforestation in the Kalimantan region of Indonesia in the early ‘90s. The method can be represented as an understanding spiral, where number of actors involved and information gathered expand with the progressive increase of REDD+ issues understanding and knowledge acquisition. The Vayda method leads researchers to an increasingly broader stakeholders’ consultation,3 based on a logical chain of evidence patterns. The collection of data related to contemporary events was characterized by the absence of project actors’ behavioral manipulation control, preserving the data reliability.

3 "Stakeholders consultation" in this study means just the fact that researchers are consulting stakeholders to understand the REDD + project issues.

Case evidence gathering was based on:
- semi structured interviews of project actors;
- socio-economic households structure survey at Belgica Native Community, to address REDD+ project community impacts (Murray, 2009):
  - document analysis;
  - direct observations based on:
    - participation in actors’ meeting;
    - observation of actors’ activities;
    - participation in actors’ Skype talks;
    - field visits;
    - participation in CCB and Forest Trends auditing;
  - the results of the Social Network Analysis (SNA). As recently applied by Prell et al. (2009), five parameters of the SNA (Density, Out-Degree Centrality — ODC, In-Degree Centrality — IDC, Group-out-Degree-Centralization — GIDC and Group-In-Degree-Centralization — GIDC) were used to describe the stakeholders’ networks in the two Peruvian case studies.

2.3. Application of indicators in case studies

To determine which indicators are relevant for the success of REDD+ they have been applied to the two case studies. In the GFI methodology, an indicator has a univocal relation with a Core Forestry Issue (e.g. Land Tenure), while it might be representative of more than one principle of good governance (e.g. Capacity and Accountability). As a result two different weighting strategies are required.

For the Core Forestry Issue GFI provides a diagnostic question and a relative set of “elements of quality” for each governance indicator. Following the GFI methodology, the grading of indicators for the single project is based on the number of satisfied elements of quality; the scores are: (0–1) Low, (2) Low–Medium, (3) Medium, (4) Medium–High, or (5) High.

In addition to GFI methodology this research considers an indicator of “good quality” when its value is higher than or equal to 4 (Medium–High quality). Indicators that simultaneously have scores higher than or equal to 4 in M&M (the successful project) and lower than 4 in Belgica (the failing project) are considered relevant for the success of REDD+ projects and obtain a final score equal to 1 (Table 2).

The establishment of the threshold of “good quality” equal to 4 (synonymous of pre-eminence), rather than for example a score of 3 (synonymous of sufficiency), is motivated by the complexity, long-lasting and expensive process of organization of REDD+ projects that require skilled actors, well-established networks and clear rules.

To understand the importance of the principle of good governance a weight of 1 is assigned to each indicator. When indicators are repre-
representative for more than a single principle the weight is divided
equally among the represented principles (e.g. for two principles: transparency = 0.5 and accountability = 0.5; for three principles: transparency = 0.33, accountability = 0.33 and participation = 0.33).

2.4. Test indicators in two successful REDD+

Conducting field case studies is time-consuming and expensive. Despite the increasing importance of governance analysis it is worth developing methodologies that favor the simplicity and manageability of the governance monitoring process. For this reason the research attempted to test the governance indicators identified as relevant in REDD+ projects for which only secondary information is available. Documents of particular interest were the validation and certification reports required by the carbon standards. Two further Peruvian REDD+ projects were selected on the documented basis of their success in terms of either received funding, credits sold or on-going implementation.

2.5. Limitations of the study

The design of an exploratory methodology could encounter several limitations. Though validity and reliability in case studies methodologies are hard to demonstrate, the Yin (2009) approach was used to detect threats and counteract them and no relevant threats seem to disclaim the study’s outcomes. The progressive contextualization used in the data collection has no well-defined borders, thus could undermine the study replication. The use of the before-after-control-intervention (BACI) first theorized by Green (1979) and of other failing REDD+ projects as control tests for relevant indicators could reinforce the study outcomes. In any case it should be noted that it is hard to find secondary information concerning failed REDD+ projects. The exploratory nature of the research suggests a cautious approach to results generalization; the logical framework should rather be used as a starting point for further REDD+ project governance analysis.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Applicable governance indicators for REDD+

The screening of the 94 GFI forestry governance indicators results in a list of 24 indicators applicable to REDD+ projects (Table 3). As a consequence of the inner structure of GFI indicators and of our screening (Fig. 4), indicators are unevenly distributed both by principles of good governance and by Core Forestry Issues. Forest Management is represented by the higher number of indicators (9), followed by Land Use Planning (7), Forest Tenure (5) and Forest Revenues and Economic Incentives (3). Both Forest Tenure and Forest Revenues and Economic Incentives are less represented since most of the indicators relate to national land and carbon rights regulations and to the taxation and fines collection systems, respectively.

Concerning the good governance principles the most represented is Capacity followed by Transparency, Accountability, Participation and Co-ordination. The governance analysis being focused at the project level it is not surprising if the actor's skills and information sharing are important.

3.2. Relevant Governance Indicators for REDD+

The use of the selected indicators in the two Peruvian case studies shows that M&M scores higher than Belgica for 19 indicators out of 24, but only 14 indicators are relevant for the successful project implementation (Table 3 — highlighted in gray). That means 14 indicators are found to be of “good quality” (higher than 4) in the successful project whereas they are valued as lower than 3 in the failing project. Land Use Planning and Forest Management are the most important issues determining project success. Land Tenure and Forest

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core forestry issues</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>REDD+ project score</th>
<th>Relevant</th>
<th>Relevance value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest tenure</td>
<td>Capacity to negotiate and design forest contracts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use planning</td>
<td>Access to relevant information for land use planning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest management</td>
<td>Local community participation in forest management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest revenues and economic incentives</td>
<td>Transparent forest revenue sharing mechanisms</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bold is to highlight the case of relevance of the indicator.
Revenues and Economic Incentives appear instead less relevant, with the latter not being represented at all. In particular, both Forest Tenure and Forest Revenues and Economic Incentives are not relevant for the success because their quality is similar in the two projects (Fig. 5).

Forest Revenues and Economic Incentives indicators were found to be of “good quality” in both the projects. Both M&M and Belgica actors are in fact particularly skilled in financial and economic issues and capable of maintaining a high level of management of incomes. Concerning Forest Tenure the similar national background is likely to heavily influence the projects.

On the other hand, M&M being already certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) allows this project to score far higher in terms of quality of Forest Management (100% “good quality” vs. 0% of Belgica) and in terms of Land Use Planning.

Comparing the importance of the principles of good governance derived from the set of applicable indicators with those defined as relevant (Fig. 4), it is possible to highlight that participation, coordination and capacity are less determinant than transparency and accountability for the success of the M&M project in Peru. Transparency and accountability increase from 28.5 to 35.7% and from 17.9 to 21.4%, respectively. In other words, the Belgica project is lacking in transparency and accountability. In effect, from the Social Network Analysis carried out during the field work for the two Peruvian projects, the organizational structure of M&M appears to be linear, with few actors and with the major ones (logging companies, NGOs — CCX Aggregator) having a clear role and the same relevance and access to information. On the contrary, the Belgica structure is more ramified (numerous consultants), with the project leader (a private company) being the only economic agent actively involved in the decision-making process, due also to the incapacity of the Belgica Community to lead the project organization. This situation favors efficient coordination but is characterized by a chaotic continuous variation of consultants, leading to a situation where the lack of trustworthiness harms the transparency.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core forestry issues</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Principles of good governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest tenure</td>
<td>Capacity to negotiate and design forest contracts</td>
<td>Trans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity to resolve forest tenure disputes</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public access to information about forest tenure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory mapping of community forest tenure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accessible and effective dispute resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use planning</td>
<td>Access to relevant information for land use planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional coordination for land use planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of grassroots interests and marginalized groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparent process for land use planning</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meaningful public participation in land use planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality and accessibility of information about land use plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to information about compliance with the land use plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest management</td>
<td>Clear process for public participation in policy-making</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meaningful public participation in policy-making</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local community participation in forest management</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of forest fires and other disturbances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective management of protected areas and indigenous lands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National forest inventories</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring changes in forest cover</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent forest monitoring</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest revenues and economic incentives</td>
<td>Capacity of civil society organizations to engage in forest revenue issues</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparent forest revenue sharing mechanisms</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparent management of extra-budgetary/resource funds</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant indicators for the success of REDD+ projects are also reported in grey background.
3.3. Testing indicators

Two successful REDD+ projects have been selected to test the methodology: the “Juma Sustainable Development Reserve Project: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation in the State of Amazonas, Brazil” and the “Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project” in Bolivia. Other projects, such as the “Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh, Indonesia”, despite having been validated under the CCB or other carbon standards, have not yet been financed and are not currently selling carbon credits.4

In the Juma project 13 indicators out of 14 (92.8%) have scores higher than 3, while for Noel Kempff the proportion is 9 out of 14 (64.3%). In the Juma project the indicator “National Forest Inventories” scores 0 since no forestry inventory has so far taken place and data have been obtained through satellite images and default parameters. In Noel Kempff the 5 indicators scoring 3 or lower are part of the Forest Management issues and are due to the numerous criticisms received from NGOs such as Greenpeace (Densham et al., 2009) about a lack of involvement and meaningful participation of the local population. Major constraints in valuing indicators are, as in the case of Noel Kempff, the presence of controversial sources of information and the absence of dedicated web sites where information about the project is constantly updated.

4. Conclusions

This exploratory research is a first attempt to set up a methodology to identify which governance features are more relevant for the success of REDD+ projects. With the increasing number of REDD+ projects in the OTC carbon market, this attempt seems timely and helpful. Other relevant initiatives are developing governance indicators specifically for REDD+ projects but at a much larger scale, with reference to national or international schemes and policies.

The methodology adopted shows that governance issues related to Forest Management and Land Use Planning are the most relevant in determining the success of REDD+ projects. When the private sector is heavily involved in the forest carbon business, governance issues related to land tenure redistribution of carbon credits are likely to be quickly resolved. Whether it happens on a sound ethical basis is hard to detect. The Peruvian case studies show us that voluntary forest certification makes the difference in terms of governance quality: being certified under the FSC scheme allows a forest manager to prepare the ground for successful REDD+ projects.

Among the five principles of good governance recommended by GFI, transparency and accountability appear to be the more crucial and critical for the success of REDD+ projects in Peru. A network of actors with carefully defined roles and established trustworthiness looks to be essential for the delivery of a project where the design phase can last years.

The attempt to reduce the amount of information needed to understand governance issues can lead to ambiguous results. The application of the proposed logical framework to case studies where only secondary, thus cheaper, information is available shows that the quality of the information itself is essential. Validation and verification reports accompanied by project design documents are the starting point for the analysis. The investigations conducted by NGOs and other civil society organizations that are likely to be less self-celebrative are also essential. The methodology responds adequately to the Juma REDD+ project whereas it fails the test on the Noel Kempff project. More testing, followed by a calibration of the method, is needed. Indeed, past experience shows clearly that, even with bad governance, REDD+ projects can be delivered to the market.

Appendix A. Description of the two case studies

Table A.2 reports full detail for the two REDD+ projects.

Table A.2 reports full detail for the two REDD+ projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>Maderacre &amp; Maderiya</th>
<th>Belgica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project developers</td>
<td>The concessions owners Maderica S.A.C. (small associated forest owners), and Maderaia S.A.C. supported by the NGOs Greenpeace and AIDER.</td>
<td>Consorcio Belgica: a private consortium which includes multiple private companies, SSSAP (NGO), and Comunidad Nativa Belgica (the landowner).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deforestation and forest degradation drivers and agents</td>
<td>The construction of the South Interoceanic Highway will lead to an increase of immigration, agriculture and residential land demand, firewood, timber and bushmeat consumption.</td>
<td>Selective logging carried on by local companies hired by the Native Community has been frequently reported to infringe the Peruvian Forest Law due to over harvesting. The construction of the South Interoceanic Highway will lead to an increase of immigration, agriculture and residential land demand, firewood, timber and bushmeat consumption. In addition the Belgica community itself is increasingly demanding for agriculture land, while the bordering Brazilian Cico Mendez Reserve holders are using the Belgica community land for cattle grazing. Uncontrolled selective logging and degradation activities will continue and even increase with the opening of the South Interoceanic Highway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Selective logging will continue under FSC certification but the pressure of economic activities carried on by immigrants will increase.</td>
<td>• IFM and reducing emissions from conventional logging through FSC certification;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose project activities</td>
<td>• Improve forest management (IFM) through FSC certification; • Patrolling and a new control post establishment; • Environmental education; • 100% borders delimitation; • Agriculture land management (ALM): improve pre-existent agriculture and cattle ranching productivity in leakage belt; • Sustainable development or rural communities living in buffer zones.</td>
<td>• ALM: improve pre-existent agriculture and cattle ranching productivity of Belgica Community; • Reduced emissions from fire and deforestation due to incursions of Brazilian farmers; • Increased knowledge of tropical agriculture and forest management; • Eco-tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the carbon price</td>
<td>7 USD</td>
<td>Undefined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is paid to stakeholders</td>
<td>Concession owners receive direct payment for the carbon credits while the two NGOs are paid for the PDD preparation and brokerage services</td>
<td>Once the project will start the 60% of income from carbon credits will go indirectly to the Native Community through a Trust Fund with social performance based criteria upon withdrawal from the community members (es, following Bolsa Floresta model).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The M&M project present less stakeholders’ classes and less actors within each class respect to Belgica (Table A.2). There are three reasons behind the simplest M&M organizational structure:

1. M&M is selling all the project credits Greenoxx, a CCX aggregator, thus the target market is channelled and unilateral, already specified and with fixed requirements;
2. M&M has already obtained the FSC certification, hence has already detailed knowledge of its forest area;
3. No people leave in M&M’s concession area, while all the 80 Belgica Community members are living inside the Belgica area.

Stakeholders listed by categories and classes in the two REDD + case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Indirect internal Consultants</th>
<th>Direct internal Brokers</th>
<th>Final buyers Local community</th>
<th>Project funders</th>
<th>PDD developers</th>
<th>Project leaders</th>
<th>Project owners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>FB</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>PO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;M</td>
<td>Universities, specialists and others</td>
<td>Several possible Iñapari, Brazilian Chico Mendez Extractives Reserve</td>
<td>Several possible Iñapari, several</td>
<td>Several possible</td>
<td>Greenox (NGO) Forinvest</td>
<td>AIDER (NGO) Consorcio Belga</td>
<td>Maderacce S.A.C. Belgaica Native community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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References


